We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers. Investors have dispersed valuations, holding shares in …rms they value more highly, and a successful o¤er must win approval from the median target shareholder. We derive the consequences for an acquiring …rm's takeover o¤er-its size and cash/equity structure-and implications for takeover premia and …rm returns. Cash o¤ers are best for the acquirer when the acquirer's own valuation exceeds the median target shareholder's. Equity o¤ers are best given the reverse. The acquirer's share price always rises following cash acquisitions, but can fall following equity o¤ers. The combined target-acquirer return is always higher after cash acquisitions than equity acquisitions (which can be negative). We characterize how synergies and uncertainty about target shareholder valuations a¤ect the optimal o¤er and probability a takeover succeeds.
Introduction
Heterogeneity-in beliefs, derived utility, tastes, etc.-is a pervasive characteristic of many economic settings. This is particularly true in …nancial markets, where di¤erent investors attach very di¤erent valuations to stocks, and some investors value their shares in a …rm far above the market price. Anecdotes indicating this can be drawn from messages on various …nancial "chat rooms." 1 This paper integrates such investor heterogeneity into a theory of takeovers, building an equilibrium model that accounts for heterogeneous investors on both sides of the takeover. We investigate how the management of an acquiring …rm should design its takeover bid-its size and cash/equity structure-in light of its own private valuations, and we derive the consequences for takeover premia paid, target and acquiring …rm returns, and likelihood of successful takeovers. We show how our model can reconcile a broader set of empirical regularities than existing theories, and derive several new testable implications.
In our model, a potential acquirer develops a synergy with a target …rm and would thus gain from acquiring it. An acquisition o¤er consists of either an amount of cash in exchange for a target shareholder's ownership interest, or an equity stake in the joint (merged) …rm. To succeed, a takeover o¤er must win approval from a majority of shareholders. If the majority agrees to sell their shares, the target is absorbed by the acquirer, becoming a single entity.
We capture the existing lack of consensus about a …rm's value by assuming that di¤erent shareholders hold di¤erent private valuations of their …rms (Miller, 1977, Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002 , and Bagwell, 1991 make similar assumptions). 2 In practice, institutional investors often substantially disagree over what a …rm's future earnings and hence future share prices will be. One manifestation of this is the radically di¤erent one-year target share 1 "I would rather see PolyMedica Corporation (PLMD) continue to operate as a stand-alone company than be taken over by something BIG in the near future. A takeover premium of let's say 20% would certainly be nice, but it's game over for us as stockholders in PLMD.... I have more faith in management producing higher returns than that!" 15-Feb-06 03:41 am. Yahoo Message Board.
-PLMD closed at $43.43 on February 15, 2006. On August 28, 2007 Medco Health Solutions announced it would buy PLMD in an all-cash deal worth $1.5 billion. The purchase price valued PLMD at $53 per share, a 22% premium for that (presumably) disappointed shareholder. 2 The literature on disagreement and di¤erences of opinion between investors-Harris and Raviv, 1993, Morris, 1996-adopts a related approach. prices set for the same stock by analysts at di¤erent institutional investors. 3 We similarly integrate private considerations for the management of the acquiring …rm.
When valuations are heterogeneous, not only do a …rm's shareholders disagree on their …rm's value, but shareholders also have higher valuations than non-holders, re ‡ecting that investors establish positions in stocks they deem "undervalued."A target's share price is determined by the private valuation of its marginal shareholder, who values the …rm the least.
A successful takeover o¤er, however, must win approval from the median shareholder who attaches a higher private valuation to the target. It follows that successful takeover o¤ers must be at a premium over the extant share price. This e¤ectively endows target shareholders with bargaining power, allowing the marginal shareholder to extract signi…cant rents even when an acquirer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. Consistent with this prediction, takeover premia are often high even when there is no evidence of other interested bidders who might give rise to a bidding war (see Andrade et al., 2001 , or Betton et al., 2008 , for a survey, or Fishman, 1988) , so that one would expect an acquiring …rm to be able to extract substantial surplus in the absence of valuation heterogeneity at the target …rm.
Beyond the simple prediction of takeover premia driven by investor heterogeneity, we analyze the acquiring …rm's choice of whether to use cash or equity in its takeover bid.
Unlike cash o¤ers, equity o¤ers require an acquiring …rm's manager to cede some of his private valuation for his …rm, but allow target shareholders to retain greater stakes in the target, and thus more of their private valuations. That is, equity o¤ers mandate a transfer of private values from the acquiring …rm's management and shareholders to target …rm share- 3 Inspection of share price targets reveals that for larger …rms (e.g., with market caps exceeding $50 Billion), which are potential acquirers, the range of price targets is roughly 35-40% of their share prices; and for smaller …rms with market caps between $100 million and $6 Billion that are potential targets the range of disagreement over price targets typically exceeds the outstanding share price. Price targets are higher relative to share price for the vast majority of smaller …rms, indicating that in percentage terms, private valuations of potential targets are both higher and more dispersed. Appropriately scaled year-ahead earnings forecasts reveal similar levels of disagreement between institutional investors. Institutional analysts have strong incentives to deliver accurate forecasts of earnings and share price targets-those who get them wrong are likely to be …red, while those that do well receive large bonuses, either from their employer or a competing institutional investor who hires them away. In our setting, these large di¤erences in assessments translate into large di¤erences in private valuations. Papers that document upward-sloping supply curves for shares (i.e., heterogeenity in investor valuations) in takeover contexts include Bagwell (1992) , Bradley, Desai and Kim (1987) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007). holders. The optimal means of payment therefore hinges on the private valuation of the acquirer's manager relative to that of the median target shareholder-cash is optimal when the acquirer's manager has a relatively high private valuation, and equity is optimal when the median target shareholder's valuation is relatively higher. Our prediction on the means of payment emphasizes the contrast in private valuations of management at the acquirer and the median shareholder at the target. This distinguishes it from theories that focus on a manager's desire to use equity when he believes the market overvalues his …rm (Chatterjee, John and Yan 2012), which, in e¤ect, is when the marginal shareholder valuation is high.
We establish that the return to the combined …rm in a cash acquisition is always at least as high as that in an otherwise identical equity acquisition. We then show that an acquirer's stock price can fall following an (optimal) equity o¤er, but not after a cash o¤er.
This re ‡ects that the interests of the acquiring …rm's management and its shareholders are aligned with cash o¤ers, but not necessarily with equity o¤ers. In particular, management and shareholders value cash similarly, so a cash o¤er that appeals to an acquiring …rm's management also appeals to its shareholders. In contrast, with heterogeneous private valuations, they value equity di¤erently, and when the acquiring …rm's management's private valuation is lower than that of its shareholders, it may make an equity o¤er that its shareholders do not like. Moreover, equity o¤ers are attractive precisely when the valuation of the acquiring …rm's management is lower than the median target shareholder's, suggesting that this circumstance is likely.
These predictions are consistent with Andrade et al. (2001) , who …nd that market reactions to cash acquisitions are positive, but those to equity acquisitions are mostly negative.
Indeed, we …nd that after an optimal equity o¤er, the combined …rm's share price can be less than the sum of their pre-acquisition standalone share prices. This possible drop in market assessment re ‡ects that pre-merger, investors hold the …rms they value most. However, when …rms merge, investors must hold both …rms, diluting their claims to their preferred …rms. As a result, combined acquirer-target returns can be negative when the synergies driving an acquisition are not large enough to compensate investors for this dilution.
Our …ndings provide an alternative explanation for the observed negative returns for ac-quirers. For instance, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) …nd that around acquisition announcements, acquiring-…rm shareholders lose 12 cents per dollar spent on acquisitions.
Our explanation is driven only by valuation heterogeneity and does not rely on stock market mispricing (as in Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) , asymmetric information (as in Malmendier et al., 2012) , or irrationality. While not dismissing such possibilities, we o¤er a theoretical alternative with fully rational, optimizing behavior driven by synergies associated with wealth creation. Rather than solely being "wealth destruction,"our model suggests that the empirically observed negative acquirer and combined acquirer-target returns may merely be a manifestation of what happens to the valuations of marginal shareholders. Related, we provide an explanation for the so-called "diversi…cation discount"found by Berger and Ofek (1995) , Lamont and Polk (2001) , and Graham et al. (2002) -mergers between less-related …rms are associated with lower returns. Importantly, our analysis shows that this discount is not necessarily due to low synergies, but may just re ‡ect larger di¤erences in valuations between target and acquiring …rm shareholders when the two …rms come from less-related industries.
We then investigate the implications of the fact that a target's share price only reveals the private valuation of its marginal shareholder, leaving potentially signi…cant uncertainty about the median valuation. As a result, an acquirer does not know exactly how much to bid in order to assure itself of success. We show that if synergies are high enough, then increased uncertainty about the median target shareholder's valuation causes an acquirer to raise its o¤er in order to reduce the likelihood that its o¤er is rejected and have the synergies go unrealized. If, instead, synergies are lower, increased uncertainty causes the acquirer to lower its o¤er, since the cost of a failed o¤er is less and greater uncertainty increases the chance that even a low o¤er might be accepted. Thus, whether uncertainty about target shareholder valuations raises or reduces the optimal o¤er hinges crucially on the size of the synergies.
Most theories of takeovers do not provide a reason for why takeovers may fail. A corollary of our …ndings related to uncertainty about the median shareholder's valuation is that o¤ers fail with positive probability even when synergies are large enough that both the median target shareholder and acquirer could bene…t from an acquisition. We also o¤er an explanation for why takeover bids may be rejected even though target shareholders understand that rejection will cause their share price to fall-the target's share price re ‡ects the value of its marginal shareholder, the shareholder who most strongly favors the takeover, while a takeover's success hinges on the assessment of the target's median shareholder.
We predict that a target's share price should always rise following a takeover o¤er that is attractive to the marginal target shareholder who determines price, but which must also be attractive to the median shareholder to succeed. Its share price will rise further if a takeover succeeds, but fall if it fails. By contrast, an acquirer's share price will move in the same direction after a successful takeover as it moved after the announcement of the takeover o¤er.
If, instead, a takeover fails, we predict that share prices will return to their original levels.
These predictions allow us to distinguish empirically between our theory and theories based on informational asymmetries that explain declines in an acquirer's share price. Malmendier, Moretti and Peters (2012) observe that when an acquiring …rm has private information about its value, equity o¤ers suggest that its stock is overvalued. Hence, its share price could fall after an equity o¤er due to the bad news that it reveal. However, their subsequent predicted share price dynamics di¤er from ours: their model predicts that an acquirer's share price should rise with approval as long as synergies are positive or target shareholder approval re ‡ects a positive assessment by target shareholders, and fall when takeovers fail. Importantly, Savor and Lu (2009) provide support for our theory: they …nd that in the three-day window around an announcement that a takeover failed for exogenous reasons, the acquirer's share price rises by 3%, o¤setting the decline when the takeover was …rst announced.
We next present the model, and analyze optimal equity and cash o¤ers. We then study which type of o¤er the acquiring …rm …nds optimal, and derive the consequences for market reactions. Following this, we analyze how the extent of uncertainty about the median shareholder's valuation a¤ects o¤ers, probability of success, and share price movements following announcement and shareholder vote. Proofs are in an appendix.
Base Model
Firms and Investors. The economy features a potential acquirer …rm A and a potential takeover target T . We normalize each …rm to have one share outstanding. Our base model focuses on two groups of risk-neutral investors who di¤er in their private valuations for the two …rms. One group of investors consists of types A 2 [0; 1) who place values V A + A on …rm A and V T on …rm T ; the other group of investors consists of types T 2 [0; 1) who place values V T + T on …rm T and V A on …rm A. Thus, a type j shareholder has a per-share valuation j ( j ) = V j + j for …rm j = A; T .
For each j 2 fA; T g, we denote the measure of type j investors by Y j ( ) : [0; 1) ! [0; M j ]; that is, Y j ( j ) denotes the mass of those type j investors whose private valuations do not exceed j , and M j denotes the total mass of all type j investors. Further, we denote the cumulative wealth of type j investors with private valuations of at least j byG j ( j ).
The functionG j ( ) is related to type j investors'measure by the following:
where W j ( ) denotes the wealth density of type j investors. 4 We assume thatG j (0) > V j , which will imply (see equation (2) below) that the marginal shareholder's private valuation j is strictly positive. This scenario (that j > 0) is more interesting than the other scenario of j = 0 which would obtain ifG j (0) V j .
We assume for simplicity that investors have no other wealth and no borrowing is allowed. Thus, an investor can invest any amount in each …rm, up to his wealth limit. The limited access to capital means that the highest valuation investor does not hold the entire …rm, giving rise to a downward sloping demand curve. 5 Market clearing pins down the 4 We simplify the presentation by assuming, as in equation (1), that all investors with a particular private value have the same level of wealth (such that W j ( ) exists). However, note that our analysis does not rely on equation (1) , that is, our results hold generally without assuming all investors with a particular private value have the same level of wealth. 5 This formulation is standard when modeling heterogeneous shareholders (see Miller, 1977 , or Bagwell, 1991 . This re ‡ects that what is crucial for qualitative …ndings is that the induced demand curves slope down, and not the reasons why they do. One can alternatively provide primitives for downward sloping private valuation j of the marginal shareholder of …rm j:
Equation (2) re ‡ects optimization by investors: they will either not invest at all if all …rms are deemed to be overvalued, or invest all their wealth in the …rm which they deem to be most undervalued. Thus, a type j investor invests all his wealth in …rm j if his private valuation exceeds j , and invests in neither …rm if his private valuation is below j .
The trading prices of the …rms re ‡ect the valuations of their marginal holders:
or, after plugging in (2),
From equation (4) , whose approval is required for a takeover to succeed. To capture this uncertainty, we denote this conditional distribution over T by F T ( ), with associated
Intuitively, this uncertainty means that although the acquiring …rm can infer the valuation of the marginal shareholder from the market-clearing stock price, it is unlikely to know the median target shareholder's exact valuation.
Acquirer Management' s Valuations and Information. Like its shareholders, the acquirer management has a positive private valuation of …rm A, attaching value V A + M A , where M A > 0, but only values the target at V T . We interpret V A + M A as the manager's assessment of his …rm's long-term value. We assume that the manager maximizes the long-term pro…ts of shareholders based on his assessment of the …rm value, or equivalently, the manager has an equity stake in the …rm and maximizes his own pro…t. demand via risk averse agents whose private valuations enter mean returns. We forego this approach because qualitative outcomes are unchanged, and takeover o¤ers then a¤ect stock-holding choices on the intensive margin (how much to hold), rather than just on the extensive margin (with wealth constraints, the choice becomes whether to hold), complicating analysis and presentation.
Timing. The sequence of events is as follows. At t = 0, a synergy S > 0 develops between …rms A and T . Synergy S is public information and the valuation of the joint …rm is additive for all investors. Thus, a type A investor values the joint …rm at
At t = 1, the acquiring …rm's management makes an o¤er. At t = 2, target shareholders decide whether to accept or reject the o¤er. The o¤er is accepted if and only if at least 50% of target shareholders vote in favor. We assume that following a favorable vote, there is a freeze-out of non-tendered shares, and the target is absorbed by the acquirer. This assumption mirrors general practice-freeze-outs occur in over 90% of US and UK takeovers (Gomes, 2001) in order to eliminate free riding.
Discussion. Our assumption that all acquiring-…rm shareholders value the target at V T and all target shareholders value the acquirer at V A eases presentation, but is unimportant for our …ndings. It is designed to capture the fact that even within narrowly-de…ned industries (e.g., biotechnology), few investors will have positive private values for any given pair of …rms.
Here, the relevant pair is the target and acquirer. Section 5 relaxes this structure so that some investors have private valuations of both …rms, and shows how our results are robust.
Our model structure is designed to capture two key dimensions of valuation heterogeneities. First, j represents the di¤erence between how the marginal shareholder of …rm j values …rm j and how the marginal shareholder in another …rm values …rm j: it measures the extent to which shareholders of the two …rms di¤er in their valuations of their respective …rms, and we will show that it is the driving force for the diversi…cation discount that we …nd.
Second, the di¤erence T T in the valuations of the median and marginal target shareholder is the key measure of dispersion in valuations among target shareholders, and drives the o¤er premia. The standard empirical approach to measuring heterogeneity in investor beliefs is to use the dispersion in analyst forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings (Moeller et al., 2005 , Chatterjee et al., 2012 . However, our model suggests that empirical researchers might additionally want to exploit the information in one-year-ahead share price "targets"set by institutional analysts to obtain a proxy for T T . A measure of the median target shareholder valuation T is the median of those price targets conditional on those price targets exceeding the outstanding share price (as it is these institutional investors that plausibly hold the …rm). This measure is more direct and may have less measurement error than traditional measures.
Importantly for the ability of our model to match quantitatively the takeover premia found in the data, the variation in share price targets and earnings forecasts is quite large relative to the current share prices of potential takeover targets. For example, for moderatesized biotech …rms, the range of price targets set by institutional investors often exceeds the outstanding stock price. The implied large di¤erences in private values mean that our model can reconcile the magnitudes of o¤er premia found in the data.
Di¤erences in private valuations tend to be high in percentage terms for young growth stocks-potential targets-because small di¤erences in views (e.g., of the probability a drug works) imply large di¤erences in discounted future cash ‡ows. Arrival of information about success or future customer bases may take years-so there is no reason for these di¤erences to be "arbitraged away". Di¤erences in private valuations tend to be smaller in percentage, albeit not absolute, terms, for larger …rms with established revenue sources.
We assume away private valuations for synergies. None of our results are qualitatively a¤ected as long as private valuations of synergies are small relative to those for a …rm's assets in place. 6 This is often the relevant scenario-synergies are typically tiny relative to a …rm's assets, so disagreements about their values should be similarly tiny. Indeed, synergies are often well-understood. For example, the value-added to a biotech …rm of a pharmaceutical …rm's salesforce that informs doctors and coordinates delivery should be well-understood.
So, too, the value of access to internal capital is easy to assess, so that disagreements about its value are likely to be small. Of course, one can imagine scenarios where synergies are more di¢ cult to identify, for example because they may rely on cross-selling opportunities between the acquirer and the target, in which case disagreements about the synergies may be larger. Even then, our results apply as long as the disagreements related to the value of the synergies do not overwhelm those associated with the standalone values of the …rms'assets. 7 To ease analysis, we assume that the takeover opportunity is unexpected. What matters for our results is that it is not fully anticipated. The market response to takeover announcements makes clear that this is the relevant scenario-share prices would not move were the takeover fully anticipated. If the market attaches a positive probability to a takeover, then the pre-merger share prices account for it, reducing the absolute magnitudes of the predicted return e¤ects that we …nd, but not otherwise altering their qualitative properties.
Analysis
We …rst examine equity and cash o¤ers assuming that the payment method (equity or cash) is exogenously determined. We then endogenize the method of payment.
Exogenous Equity O¤ers.
In an equity o¤er, an acquirer o¤ers I shares of the joint …rm in exchange for all of the target shares. We denote the valuation of the target shareholder who is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er of I by E (I). This shareholder's payo¤
To determine his payo¤ E if the takeover succeeds, note that immediately after a successful equity o¤er, trade will occur if A 6 = T , until the marginal shareholders of the joint …rm have the same private valuation. Denote the private valuation of the marginal shareholder in the joint …rm by~ J , where the tilde highlights that its realization, which is between A and T , will hinge on the realized distributions of shareholder wealth distributions,G A ( ) andG T ( ). We decompose the di¤erent scenarios as follows:
(i) If E ~ J , then the median target shareholder will hold the joint …rm, so his post-
(ii) If E <~ J , then the median target shareholder will not hold the joint …rm. Instead, he will sell his shares at the market price, which is determined by the marginal holder of the joint …rm, so his (random) post-takeover per-share payo¤ is E =
Summing over the two possibilities, we have
That the eventual realization of synergies, or of their size, may be highly uncertain does not a¤ect our results.
Then the indi¤erence condition T = E implies that E solves
The value of~ J is pinned down by the market-clearing condition:
To understand part (i) of (6), note that I 1+I on the left-hand-side is the fraction of the joint …rm held by the original target shareholders, 1
is the fraction of the original target shareholders who want to sell, and (V T + V A + S +~ J ) is the joint …rm's market value.
Thus, the left-hand-side is the total dollar amount that those original target shareholders (who wish to sell) can sell for, which must equal the right-hand-side, which is the total wealth of those type A investors who will buy the joint …rm. Part (ii) of (6) follows from a similar structure. The system of equations, (5) and (6), jointly determine the values of I and~ J .
To simplify presentation, we assume:
A1. The indi¤erent target shareholder in an equity o¤er has a higher private valuation than the marginal acquiring …rm shareholder: E A .
Approval of a takeover hinges on the median target shareholder's valuation. When T > A , then even when all acquiring …rm shareholders continue to hold the joint …rm, so do at least half of the target shareholders (weighted by wealth), including the median target shareholder. We believe that this is typically the relevant scenario, i.e., that assumption A1
captures most real world settings. 8 In this case, equation (5) simpli…es to
The acquiring …rm's manager chooses I to maximize his expected payo¤s, balancing the tradeo¤ that a higher o¤er, although more costly, is more likely to succeed. If a takeover suc-8 Section 3.1 provides a su¢ cient condition under which A1 holds for an optimal equity o¤er. ceeds, the joint …rm's market value re ‡ects the value attached by its marginal shareholder:
Because~ J is always less than max f A ; T g, the (random) market value of the joint …rm, g M V J , is always less than the sum of the two …rms'pre-merger valuations, P T + P A , whenever the synergy is small relative to the marginal shareholder's valuation, i.e., whenever
S < min f A ; T g. We denote the combined return over the takeover window from holding equal positions in the acquirer and the target byR E :
Recalling that min f A ; T g measures the extent to which shareholders of the two …rms di¤er in their valuations of their respective …rms, we have the following result: 9
Result 1 The combined acquirer-target returnR E following an equity acquisition is nega-
the combined acquirer-target return is positive.
Thus, the combined return is negative if the synergy is less than the heterogeneity in valuations between shareholders of the two …rms. This result re ‡ects that a merger forces investors to hold …rms they may otherwise not hold, diluting their claims to their favorite …rms.
The share price of the joint …rm is:
InterpretingP J I as the cash equivalent of the equity o¤er, we have:
Then, any equity o¤er that is accepted by a majority of target shareholders has a cash equivalent that is at a premium over the target's market value: 9 The result follows from the relation min
The intuition for this premium is that a takeover dilutes a target shareholder's claim to the target-he now only has a claim of I 1+I to his private valuation T -for which he must be compensated. This dilution a¤ects every target shareholder, but the resulting loss is more severe for the median target shareholder than the marginal shareholder. When the median target shareholder is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting, the marginal target shareholder, who determines the prices of the target and joint …rm, must be strictly better o¤.
Together, the continuity of payo¤s and the strict inequality imply that the result extends as long as T is not too much larger than A . 10 Empirically, the acquiring …rm is typically larger than the target, in which case the su¢ cient conditions for the result hold as long as private valuations do not decrease too rapidly in the common value component of the …rm.
We believe the opposite scenario is far more common. Accordingly, we now assume Noting thatP J I is also the target's stock price after a takeover, Proposition 1 implies:
Then in a successful equity o¤er, the target's return R T =
is always positive. 10 This holds for our subsequent results that also assume A T .
In contrast, the acquirer's return after a successful equity takeover, R A = P J P A P A , can be negative. To see this, substitute I from (7) into (10) to obtain the joint …rm's share price,
Note from equation (11) thatP J < V A + S because E > J means that the ratio of the relative valuations of the marginal and median target shareholder,
, the acquirer's return is negative whenever the synergy is small. Indeed, even when S > A , the acquirer's return can still be negative when there is enough dispersion in target shareholder valuations Exogenous Cash O¤ers. With a cash o¤er, the acquirer o¤ers cash C to target shareholders in exchange for all of their shares. We denote by C (C) the valuation of the target shareholder who is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. Immediately after a successful cash acquisition, the joint …rm is held only by the acquiring …rm's shareholders, while all type T investors hold cash. Then, since type A and T investors value the joint …rm at
respectively, any target shareholders with private values T > A will purchase claims to the joint …rm from marginal acquiring …rm shareholders. This transaction results in a new marginal holder of the joint …rm, one with a higher private valuation. Therefore, the share price of the joint …rm will satisfỹ
Rearranging (12) 
where we use the fact that~ J lies between A and T . Summarizing, we have:
Result 4 Suppose that A T . Then, ceteris paribus, the combined acquirer and target return in a cash acquisition exceeds that in an equity acquisition.
As we noted earlier, the acquiring …rm is typically larger than the target. If j increases in V j , then this would suggest that A T in most situations. When this is so, the result shows the combined acquirer and target return in a cash acquisition exceeds that in an equity acquisition. This result re ‡ects the fact that the private valuation of the marginal holder of the joint …rm in a cash o¤er exceeds A , whereas that marginal valuation in an equity o¤ers is between A and T . These results can explain the empirical …nding that, in most takeovers, the combined returns in cash o¤ers exceed those in equity o¤ers (Andrade et al., 2001).
To determine the optimal o¤er, C , note that just after a successful cash o¤er, former shareholders of the target for whom V A +V T +S + T C >P J wish to buy shares in the joint …rm. Analogously, original shareholders of the acquiring …rm for whom V A +V T +S+ A C < P J want to sell. Market clearing determinesP J . There are two possible situations:
the median target shareholder's private valuation exceeds that of the marginal shareholder of the joint …rm. Thus, the median target shareholder derives an added bene…t by holding C P J shares of the joint …rm for each share held in the target, receiving a per-share payo¤ of (V T + V A + S C + C ) C P J > C from the takeover.
1, then the median target shareholder will not hold the joint …rm, so his post-takeover per-share payo¤ is C .
As the o¤er C leaves the target shareholder with value C indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting, the indi¤erence conditions corresponding to these two scenarios yield:
Equation (13) (i) reveals that if the marginal joint …rm shareholder has a lower private valuation than the median target shareholder, then C < V T + C , i.e., the optimal cash o¤er is less than the median target shareholder's valuation. The median target shareholder uses the cash received for his shares to purchase shares in the joint …rm at its market price, which is determined by the marginal holder of the joint …rm. As the marginal joint …rm shareholder has a lower private valuation than the median target shareholder, this purchase provides the median target shareholder with an added private bene…t, making him willing to tender at a lower price (as do all shareholders with lower valuations). In Lemma 1 we relax assumption A1 in order to identify su¢ cient conditions for the median target shareholder to hold and not to hold the joint …rm in cash o¤ers, respectively:
With an optimal cash o¤er, if When the median target shareholder holds the joint …rm, the cash o¤er that makes him indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting is less than his valuation of the target, V T + C . Proposition 2 shows that even when this is so, the o¤er still exceeds the target …rm's preacquisition price, P T = V T + T , as long as the acquirer's market value is high enough. This is because then the joint …rm is expensive, so the median target shareholder only purchases a small claim and the added private bene…t received is small. Thus, to make him indi¤erent, a premium relative to the pre-acquisition price must be o¤ered. Indeed, as the acquirer's market value grows arbitrarily larger than the target's, the o¤er approaches V T + C :
Then in a successful cash o¤er, the o¤er represents a premium if the acquirer is larger than the target. More precisely, if V A > P T S then
Further, as the acquirer's market value grows arbitrarily larger than the target's value, the o¤er approaches the pre-acquisition value of the median target shareholder, V T + C : 
Optimal Payment Method
We now let the acquirer choose the type of o¤er-cash, equity, no o¤er-to make. 11 We …rst examine an acquiring …rm manager's willingness to make an equity o¤er. Prior to a takeover, his per-share payo¤ is AM = V A + A M ; if an o¤er I is accepted, his post-merger per-share payo¤ is
. Thus, the manager's expected per-share payo¤ is
where Pr( E (I) T ) is the probability that o¤er I is approved. That is, E (I) is the indifferent shareholder given o¤er I, as determined by the system of equations (5) and (6) , and
Pr( E (I) T ) is the probability that E (I) exceeds the median target shareholder's valuation, which is necessary for an o¤er's approval. The optimal o¤er I maximizes E AM , trading o¤ between the probability of winning and the size of the payo¤ when a takeover succeeds.
We now enrich the structure in Assumption A1 slightly. To guarantee that the median target shareholder holds the joint …rm following an optimal equity o¤er it su¢ ces that: Because~ J maxf A ; T g, Assumption A3 ensures that~ J E (I ). This is still a stronger structure than we need for the median target shareholder to hold the joint …rm following the optimal o¤er: typically the optimal o¤er risks failure and targets some E > l T . With this structure, the probability that an optimal equity o¤er is accepted is just Pr( E (I) T ) = F T ( E (I)). Substituting for I using equation (7), and omitting the I index on E , we write the acquiring manager's expected per-share payo¤ as:
Without loss of generality, we focus on E 2 l T ; h T because an o¤er that exceeds h T always wins, and thus is dominated by o¤ering h T ; and o¤ering less than l T always loses, and is thus equivalent to o¤ering l T . For the optimal o¤er to make the acquirer manager strictly better o¤ (i.e., E AM ( E ) > AM ), it must have a strictly positive probability of being approved by a majority of target shareholders (i.e., E > l T ). The converse is also true:
The optimal equity o¤er has a positive probability of being approved by a majority of target shareholders if and only if it renders the acquirer manager strictly better o¤.
In order for E AM ( E ) > AM , synergies must be large enough to compensate the manager for the dilution in his claim to the private valuation of his …rm:
Lemma 3 The optimal equity o¤er has a strictly positive probability of being approved by a majority of target shareholders if
If, instead,
then any o¤er that the acquiring …rm's management would like target shareholders to approve has zero probability of being approved (i.e., E = l T ).
The …rst half of the lemma says that a su¢ cient condition for an optimal equity o¤er to be accepted with positive probability is that synergies are high enough that there is positive surplus from a takeover even when the median target shareholder has the high private valuation, h T . The second half says that a su¢ cient condition for optimal equity o¤er to always be rejected is that synergies are low enough that there is no surplus from a takeover, even when the median target shareholder has the low private valuation, l T . Now suppose that it is optimal for the acquirer to make a cash o¤er C. Then its manager's expected per-share payo¤ would be:
where C (C) is the value of C corresponding to C. The optimal C maximizes C AM . As with equity, the acquiring …rm's manager must gain from a successful cash o¤er: From equation (20), the acquirer manager's per-share expected pro…t is
This, combined with C V T + C (C), yields a lower bound on the manager's pro…t:
Equation (23) and the optimality of C yield a su¢ cient condition for the acquiring …rm's manager to make a cash o¤er:
Lemma 5 An optimal cash o¤er by the acquiring …rm's management has a strictly positive probability of being approved by a majority of target shareholders if synergies exceed the lower bound on the private valuation of the median target shareholder, i.e., if S l T .
We next examine when each type of o¤er is optimal. The choice between cash and equity boils down to whether C AM ( C ) > E AM ( E ), in which case a cash o¤er is made, or C AM ( C ) < E AM ( E ), in which case an equity o¤er is optimal. Cash and equity have competing merits. Equity o¤ers require an acquiring …rm's manager to cede some of his private valuation for his …rm. This works in favor of using cash and the e¤ect rises with the manager's valuation for his …rm, M A . Conversely, equity o¤ers allow target shareholders to retain stakes in the target and thus some of their private valuations. This works in favor of using equity and the e¤ect rises with the median target shareholder's valuation, T . There is one additional e¤ect in play with cash o¤ers: as long as the price of the joint …rm is less than the median target shareholder's valuation, the median target shareholder derives an added private bene…t from holding the joint …rm, which allows the acquirer to reduce its o¤er, making a cash o¤er more attractive.
The resulting choice of means of payment depends on how the private valuation of the acquirer's management compares to that of the median target shareholder (as equity o¤ers trade claims to private values from the acquirer to target shareholders), and how the private valuation of the marginal holder of the acquiring …rm compares to that of the median target shareholder (due to the consequences for share purchases by the median target shareholder).
We show that if M
A > h T , then an acquiring …rm's management prefers a cash o¤er to equity o¤ers, but equity o¤ers become more attractive when M A is small: To gain intuition, consider the simple case in which T is known with certainty and the median target shareholder derives no private bene…ts from holding the joint …rm (e.g., if T A ). Regardless of whether equity or cash is used, the acquiring …rm's optimal o¤er leaves the median target shareholder indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er.
Thus, the acquiring …rm's management prefers cash to equity if and only if the sum of its payo¤ plus that of the median target shareholder is higher with cash. Equity and cash o¤ers di¤er in their impacts on the loss of private valuations in a merger. With equity, the acquirer holds a fraction 1 1+I of the joint …rm and the target holds the remaining fraction I 1+I . Hence, the total loss of private valuation with an equity o¤er is I
In contrast, the loss with a cash o¤er is T (given our premise that the median target shareholder does not hold the joint …rm). Thus, the loss with the equity o¤er is greater if and only if
which is exactly the condition from the proposition.
Existing theories (e.g., Chatterjee, John and Yan 2012) predict that a manager wants to use equity when the market overvalues his …rm's equity. Proposition 3 is consistent with such theories in that it shows that equity is preferred when an acquirer's private valuation is low relative to its marginal shareholder's private valuation (i.e., its equity is overvalued). 12 However, our analysis provides additional insights. Proposition 3 shows that the choice between cash and equity should also re ‡ect the private valuations of target shareholders: equity is preferred to cash when the acquiring …rm's manager has a low private valuation relative to the median target shareholder. Thus, the target's market value, as determined by its marginal shareholder, does not directly enter this calculation.
Proposition 3 establishes that the acquirer is more likely to use cash if its manager's private valuation for his …rm is higher. Empirically, one can interpret the acquiring …rm's manager as its CEO. As long as the size of the manager's stake in his …rm increases with his private valuation, we have the following novel testable prediction:
Corollary 2 The greater is the acquirer manager's holding of his company, the more likely the acquirer is to o¤er cash.
Stock Price E¤ects of Optimal O¤ers
Having derived how an acquiring …rm's manager designs his optimal o¤er we now show that an optimally-chosen equity o¤er may succeed, and yet cause the acquirer's stock price to fall.
Endogenous Equity O¤ers. We …rst analyze endogenous (optimal) equity o¤ers that are strictly preferred by the acquiring …rm's management to all cash o¤ers (and no o¤ers). We …rst consider the returns to the target. Recalling that the target return in an optimal equity acquisition is always positive if A T , we have:
Then, a target …rm's share price rises following a successful equilibrium equity acquisition.
We now contrast this positive return for target shareholders with what acquiring …rm shareholders may experience: Lemma 6 Suppose A3 holds and that A T . Then following a successful optimally chosen equity o¤er, the acquiring …rm's share price falls, i.e.,P J < P A , if the synergies are small enough that
(24)
The condition for the acquirer's stock price to fall following a successful equity o¤er is that the synergy be too small to compensate the marginal acquiring …rm shareholder for the dilution to his private valuation. We now use this result to characterize the possible returns associated with endogenous equity o¤ers. We establish the stronger result that not only may the acquirer's share price fall following an optimal equity o¤er, but it can fall by so much that the combined acquirer and target return is negative.
Proposition 5 If M A < A , then the combined acquirer and target return can be negative, i.e., R E < 0, following an optimal equity o¤er that the acquiring …rm's management strictly prefers to any cash o¤er and to no o¤er.
The direct corollary of Propositions 4 and 5 is:
A < A , then the acquiring …rm's share price can fall, i.e.,P J < P A , following an optimal equity o¤er that the acquiring …rm's management strictly prefers to any cash o¤er and to no o¤er.
Proposition 5 reveals that a negative combined return does not mean that a merger destroys wealth. Rather, combined returns can be negative even when synergies are positive because pre-merger, shareholders hold the …rms they value most, but post-merger, they must hold both …rms, diluting their claims to their preferred …rms. From equation (8), the result-
, then the value loss is S.
The size of the lost value to an acquiring shareholder depends on his private valuation and the extent of the dilution of his claim to that private valuation. For this loss to occur following an optimal equity o¤er, it must be that the private valuation of the acquiring …rm's management is less than that of its marginal shareholder's. Then, the marginal shareholder su¤ers a loss when its management's payo¤ is positive, but su¢ ciently small. Further, the attraction of equity o¤ers relative to cash o¤ers rises when M A is smaller-precisely because the acquiring …rm's management does not mind diluting its private valuation by as much.
Here, M A << A captures shareholders who attach higher valuations to the …rm's assets than management. 13 More generally, more extensive investor heterogeneity, as captured by a larger value of A , can cause the acquiring …rm's share price to fall.
These results provide a novel explanation for the "diversi…cation discount" observed in mergers of conglomerates in di¤erent industries: the value loss need not be because the syn- 13 Agency considerations (e.g., a manager's empire building motives) could also lead to a decrease in the acquirer's return, just as when the manager's private valuation di¤ers from target shareholders. However, a di¤erence exists: presumably, a manager's private bene…t of control does not vary with the payment method, so agency considerations do not have the same di¤erential implications for the choice between cash and equity that di¤erences between a manager's private valuation and that of the median target shareholder do. ergies are small or even negative, but rather because shareholders in the two …rms di¤er more substantively in their valuations, i.e., is larger re ‡ecting that the conglomerates are more dissimilar. That is, the diversi…cation discount may re ‡ect large di¤erences in valuations between target and acquiring …rm shareholders of each other's …rm, and not low or negative synergies. Section 5 investigates this diversi…cation discount in more detail, showing how the magnitude of the discount depends on the "similarity" between the merging …rms.
Endogenous Cash O¤ers. We now analyze endogenous cash o¤ers. These o¤ers (a) maximize the payo¤ of the acquiring …rm's management (i.e., C is optimally chosen), (b) have positive probabilities of being approved (i.e., C > l T ), and (c) are preferred to equity o¤ers. We highlight a sharp contrast between optimal equity and cash o¤ers: unlike equity o¤ers, any cash o¤er that is individually rational for an acquiring …rm's manager is also preferred by its marginal shareholder. As a result, for endogenous cash o¤ers, we have: Proposition 6 An acquiring …rm's share price always rises following a successful equilibrium cash acquisition.
Intuitively, all parties value cash in the same way. Hence, a cash o¤er that appeals to the acquiring …rm's management also appeals to its shareholders, so the joint share price increases. This result is consistent with Andrade et al.'s (2001) empirical …nding that acquiring …rms'share prices tends to drop following stock acquisitions, but not cash acquisitions.
We now compare combined acquirer and target returns in cash and equity acquisitions.
Recall that when the payment method was exogenous and A T , then the combined return in a cash acquisition exceeded that in an equity acquisition (Result 4), and the target's return was positive (i.e., the target's share price rises) as long as the target was not much larger than the acquirer (Corollary 1). These results extend when the acquiring …rm's manager selects his preferred payment method: Proposition 7 Consider two equilibrium takeovers with the same values of V A ; V T ; S; A ; T where A T , but di¤erent values of M A , so that one acquisition is with equity and the other is with cash. Then the combined return in the cash acquisition exceeds that in the equity acquisition.
Proposition 8 Suppose A T . If V A > P T S, then a target …rm's share price rises following a successful equilibrium cash acquisition.
Combining Propositions 5-8 reveals that, consistent with empirical …ndings, cash acquisitions are associated with positive and higher returns than equity acquisitions, the target experiences positive returns, but equity acquisitions can be associated with negative combined acquirer-target returns, even when equity acquisitions are optimal. Thus, we derive a number of restrictions on the data that are unique to our theory.
Comparative Statics
In this section, we impose additional structure in order to derive comparative static characterizations. Speci…cally, we assume that A = T , and that the median target share- shareholder, and^ > re ‡ects that the acquiring …rm knows the marginal shareholder valuation, which bounds its uncertainty over T . We focus on cash o¤ers (which would endogenously arise if, for example, M A is large enough); equity o¤ers have qualitatively similar features. To avoid the complications in cash o¤ers when the median target shareholder derives private bene…ts from holding the joint company, we assume that V T +^ + V A +S << 1, in which case we can approximate this additional private bene…t as zero.
For any cash o¤er C, the tendering decision of a target shareholder with private valuation is simple: accept if and only if C V T + . The probability that an o¤er C is accepted is
Without loss of generality, we focus on o¤ers where C 2 [V T +^ ; V T +^ + ]. As a function of C, the expected payo¤ of the acquiring …rm's management is:
The …rst term is the expected increment in value associated with a successful takeover o¤er, while the second term is the status quo (no acquisition) value. Di¤erentiating with respect to C yields the …rst-order condition describing the optimal o¤er:
Since the second-order conditions are satis…ed, (25) de…nes a global maximum. In addition, if the optimal o¤er C exceeds V T +^ , the o¤er must be individually rational because the acquiring …rm could always o¤er C = V T +^ and have its o¤er be rejected. Allowing for a boundary solution, the general solution for the optimal o¤er C is
Proposition 9 When the acquiring …rm's beliefs about the median target shareholder's private valuation are uniformly distributed,
The optimal o¤er C rises with the degree^ of heterogeneity in private valuations of target shareholders.
C increases with the synergy, S.
If synergies are small, S ^ , then C decreases with the extent of uncertainty .
If synergies are large, S >^ , then C …rst rises with and then falls, reaching a maximum at = S ^ 3 .
The result that C rises with the degree of heterogeneity in private values of target …rm shareholders re ‡ects the central intuition of our paper: a successful o¤er must win approval from at least 50% of shareholders, who have higher valuations than the marginal shareholder that determines the price. The result that C rises with the synergy S is also intuitive, re ‡ecting that the opportunity cost of rejection rises in S. The reason why increased uncertainty can cause an acquirer to reduce its o¤er is that greater uncertainty raises the likelihood that low o¤ers are accepted. Further, the cost of having an o¤er rejected is not too great when synergies are small, so the marginal cost of a lower o¤er is small, making lower o¤ers optimal when synergies are small. If, instead, synergies are large, there is a range where the o¤er initially rises in because the acquirer does not want to risk a failed o¤er. However, as the extent of uncertainty grows, the only way to ensure success is to keep raising the o¤er, which eventually becomes too costly. Beyond this point, the marginal increase in the probability that a higher o¤er succeeds is too small to justify increasing the o¤er further, and the optimal o¤er C begins to fall with .
We can now solve for how the synergies and degree of uncertainty faced by the acquiring …rm a¤ect the equilibrium likelihood of a successful takeover. Substituting for C yields
Proposition 10 The equilibrium probability of success falls with the degree of heterogeneitŷ and rises with the synergy S. If the synergy is less than the degree of heterogeneity, i.e., if S <^ , then the success probability rises with the extent of uncertainty, . If, instead, the synergy exceeds the degree of heterogeneity, i.e., if S >^ , then the success probability falls with .
Few theories of takeovers provide a reason for why takeover bids sometimes fail. Greater heterogeneity reduces the probability of successful o¤ers because higher o¤ers are needed for success. Greater synergies induce the acquiring …rm to raise its o¤er, increasing the probability of a successful o¤er. To understand why the probability of success rises with the extent of uncertainty when synergies are small, observe that when synergies are low, the realized private valuation of the median target shareholder must be low for target shareholders to accept an o¤er, and a higher increases this probability. However, when synergies are high, but not so high that the acquiring …rm …nds it optimal to make an o¤er that always succeeds, the probability of success falls with . This occurs because the acquiring …rm lowers its o¤er, trading o¤ a reduced probability of success against the possibility of a better deal if the realized private valuation of the median target shareholder turns out to be low.
A number of the comparative static results in Propositions 9 and 10 are testable. For example, one can proxy the extent of heterogeneity in private valuations by the dispersion in earnings forecasts of analysts or share price targets associated with investment banks and other institutional investors. The propositions would then suggest that an acquiring …rm's returns should be lower, ceteris paribus, when the variance of earnings forecasts or share price targets is greater, and that such takeovers should be more likely to fail.
Share price dynamics over the takeover process
Any o¤er that is accepted with positive probability is always at a premium over the target's stand-alone price, which is determined by the target shareholder with marginal valuation .
Following such an o¤er, the target's share price will rise to re ‡ect that (i) C > V T + , and (ii) with probability S ^ +
4
, we have C > V T + T , in which case the takeover succeeds. In this case the target's share price will rise further to re ‡ect the bene…cial resolution of uncertainty from the perspective of its marginal shareholder. However, with probability 3 S+^ 4 the o¤er is rejected, in which case the target's share price will fall to its pre-takeover value, V T + .
Moreover, a cash o¤er that appeals to the acquiring …rm's management also appeals to its shareholders (Proposition 6). Hence, following a cash bid, the acquiring …rm's share price will rise to re ‡ect the positive probability that the bid will succeed. The share price would rise further upon acceptance, re ‡ecting the bene…cial resolution of takeover uncertainty from the perspective of the acquirer; but fall to its level prior to the emergence of synergies whenever its o¤er is rejected. Hence, we have the following testable predictions:
Corollary 4 Suppose that synergies are large but not too large, i.e.,^ < S <^ + 3 , so that the equilibrium cash takeover o¤er is accepted with positive probability strictly less than one. Then, the share prices of both the target and acquiring …rms rise when synergies emerge and a cash bid is made, and rise further whenever a cash bid succeeds. Both …rms'
share prices fall whenever a cash o¤er fails.
If, instead, an acquirer makes an equity bid rather than cash, the target's share price exhibits similar dynamics. However, the acquirer's share price dynamics are unchanged only if synergies are high enough that a successful takeover results in positive acquirer returns;
this requires both that S > and for , the degree of uncertainty about the median target shareholder's value, to be small enough relative to other parameters. Otherwise, the acquiring …rm's share price will fall after an equity takeover bid, and fall further if the takeover succeeds. This prediction is the opposite of that implied by takeover theories based on asymmetric information. Malmendier, Moretti and Peters (2012) observe that when an acquiring …rm has private information about its value, equity o¤ers would suggest that its stock is overvalued, so that its share price could fall following an equity o¤er due to the bad news revealed. However, subsequently, the acquirer's share price should rise with approval as long synergies are positive or if approval re ‡ects positive private target shareholder information;
and should fall when takeovers fail due to any negative information revealed by the rejection about the acquirer and the loss of synergies. In contrast, in our setting, if an acquiring …rm's stock price falls following an equity o¤er and there is uncertainty over whether the o¤er would be accepted, then it should fall further following acceptance, but rise following rejection.
It is di¢ cult to test these predictions directly due to the endogeneity and selection issues associated with accepted and rejected o¤ers (for example, outside of our model, the takeover negotiation process may feature the possibility of a subsequent o¤er if an initial o¤er is rejected). Savor and Lu's (2009) insight was that one can get clean identi…cation by focusing on takeovers that fail for exogenous reasons, an approach that Masulis et al.
(2012) also employ. Then our model predicts that the acquirer's share price should rise back to its original level when the failure of a takeover is announced (as the transaction is unwound). Consistent with our model, in the three day window around the announcement of a takeover's failure, Savor and Lu …nd abnormal acquirer returns of 3 percent, which just o¤set the negative abnormal acquirer's returns of 3 percent when a takeover with equity was …rst announced. These twin results provide strong con…rmation of our theory.
Diversi…cation Discount
In this section, we investigate the foundations of the "diversi…cation discount"-exploring why mergers between less-related …rms are associated with lower returns. To capture the notion of " more-related"and "less-related"…rms we enhance our base model so that some investors have positive private valuations of both …rms. More-related …rms are then those in which more investors have positive private valuations for both …rms.
To ease exposition, we simplify the model so that the economy is symmetric with Each investor has an equal amount of wealth, and their total wealth is W > 2V . We measure the closeness of the two …rms with the fraction 2 [0; 1] of investors who have positive private valuations of both …rms. Thus, the total wealth of group-three investors is W , and the remaining wealth (1 )W is divided evenly between group-one and group-two investors.
The symmetry that we assume is unimportant for the qualitative results, but it sim-pli…es calculations and facilitates clean interpretations of how a¤ects the diversi…cation discount. We show that the price of the merged …rm rises with , and that when is small enough-when the …rms are more dissimilar from the perspective of most investors-the price of the merged …rm is less than the collective stand-alone values of the two …rms. The extent of the diversi…cation discount would only be greater were the private valuations of group-three investors less correlated (e.g., independent).
We …rst compute A and T , which determine the standalone market values of the …rms.
In our symmetric setting, A = T in equilibrium. To see this, suppose without loss of generality that A > T instead. Then, types AT T and types T T hold the cheaper …rm T ; only types A A hold …rm A. As a result, the total wealth of shareholders of …rm T exceeds that of shareholders of …rm A. But then the market-clearing conditions imply that the market value of T exceeds that of A, contradicting the premise that A > T . Thus, A = T .
The market-clearing conditions require that the wealth of AT investors be divided evenly between the two …rms. Then, the market-clearing condition for each …rm takes the form:
If the two …rms merge through an equity o¤er-if the acquirer o¤ers I in exchange for all shares of T -then just after the merger, group 3 investors value the joint …rm by more than group 1 and 2 investors with the same private valuation. Thus, trade will occur between group 3 investors with private valuations below , who hold neither …rm and have cash on hand, and group 1 and 2 investors with private valuations slightly above . The joint …rm's equilibrium market value of 2V + S + J is pinned down by the market-clearing condition.
That is, group 1 and 2 investors with private valuations between and J sell their shares to group 3 investors with private valuations between J 2 and . Thus,
For simplicity, we assume that J < , which happens if there is su¢ cient dispersion in the private valuations of investors, where the required extent of dispersion increases in .
A su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that W < 4V or > W 2 . This assumption rules out the corner solution of J = ; when such a solution obtains, the qualitative features of our results do not change, but the algebra is more complicated because the market-clearing condition for J ceases to hold with equality.
We now solve for J . Prior to the merger, group 3 investors divide their investments evenly between the two …rms, allocating =2 to each …rm implying that the fraction of …rm A initially held by group 1 investors is (1 ) . Equating demand and supply yields:
In this symmetric setting with uniform uncertainty, the size I of the equity o¤er does not enter the market-clearing condition (28). De…ne 
which is monotonically increasing in , going from 0 to in…nity as goes from 0 to 1.
Substituting in , the market-clearing condition simpli…es to 
where is given by (27) .
We denote by D the di¤erence between the sum of the two …rm's standalone market values and the joint …rm's market value:
When D is positive, it indicates that together the standalone market values of the two …rms exceeds the joint …rm's market value, i.e., that the combined return to the takeover is negative. We next explore how a¤ects D, and what it says about the "diversi…cation discount."Substituting in (27) for and (31) for J , we can solve for: where is given by (29).
We now derive key properties of the diversi…cation discount:
The diversi…cation discount D falls with . The maximal discount of
= S occurs at = 0, where …rms are most dissimilar. For any < 1, there exists an S( ) > 0 such that for all S < S( ), the discount is positive, i.e., D > 0.
One can interpret as capturing the degree of similarity between industries in which
A and T operate. Then, the proposition indicates that, ceteris paribus, the diversi…cation discount is larger when the two …rms are from less related industries (e.g., conglomerates), which is consistent with the empirical facts.
The intuition for this result is closely related to that from the base model in which there are only two groups of investors, where each group has a private valuation for only one …rm. This base model delivers the intuition that the diversi…cation discount re ‡ects the di¤erences in valuations between target and acquiring …rm shareholders of each other's …rm, and a merger dilutes a shareholder's holdings of his preferred …rm. When we allow for investors with private valuations of both …rms as we do here, this intuition extends in that the diversi…cation discount re ‡ects a measure of average di¤erences in valuations between target and acquiring …rm shareholders of each other's …rm. Moreover, "the average di¤erences in valuations" directly relate to the "closeness"of the two industries, which underlies our result that the magnitude of the discount falls with the closeness of the two industries.
Conclusion
We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers, and study the choice of the acquiring …rm's manager between a cash or an equity o¤er. In the resulting equilibrium, share prices are determined via market-clearing conditions and re ‡ect the valuations, wealth dynamics and optimizing behavior of all parties. Beyond characterizing when o¤ers will feature equity or cash, our model also pins down the premia paid for takeovers, target and acquiring …rm returns, the probability a takeover succeeds, and the patterns of share price dynamics following successful and unsuccessful takeovers.
Key to our analysis is the incorporation of heterogeneous investors on both sides of the acquisition-the buyer and the target-and the strategic decisionmaking of the acquiring …rm's manager. These elements combined allow us to reconcile an extensive array of empirical regularities, and provide new testable predictions. For instance, our model implies that combined target-acquirer returns are higher after cash acquisitions than after equity acquisitions, when the method of payment is chosen optimally; shareholders in smaller acquiring …rms earn systematically more in acquisitions; and CEOs of acquiring …rms with greater shareholdings should be more likely to use cash. Our model also o¤ers a new explanation for the "diversi…cation discount"stemming from the di¤erences in the values acquiring and target …rm shareholders place on each other's …rms. It can also reconcile why an acquirer's share price tends to rise following a failed takeover.
An interesting feature to integrate to our model is the role of management of the target …rm. In our model, target management's private valuation plays no role because management has no in ‡uence on the takeover outcome. However, it becomes important once target management has private information about target assets, and can make recommendations to shareholders about whether to accept or reject an o¤er. From this perspective, one could endogenize whether a tender or merger o¤er is made based on the expectation of managerial support or resistance to an o¤er, which would then have implications for the probability of acceptance conditional on target management's endorsement (i.e., a "merger") or resistance (i.e., a "hostile" tender o¤er). Given that target management's recommendation is likely driven by both its private valuation (management and shareholder interests can diverge) and its private information (management and shareholder interests are aligned), target shareholders should be able to partially infer its management's private information from its recommendation, which, in turn, in ‡uences their voting decisions. In turn, target management's role in ‡uences an acquiring …rm's o¤er.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The indi¤erence condition (5) yields
which givesP
Next we provide a general proof for the proposition without imposing A1. Consider two cases.
(1) J E . ThenP J I P T = E T > 0, establishing the proposition.
(2) J < E . Then, because J is between T and A , the condition A T yields J T . Thus, we havẽ
establishing the proposition. Next, suppose the median target shareholder's valuation is known ( E is constant) and consider how the premium varies as V A rises. Assume both A and S are nondecreasing in V A . First assume V A is small enough that J < E . Rewrite equation (34) asP
Then, as V A increases, V T + V A + S + E increases while E J does not increase (but is still positive). Thus 1 E J V T +V A +S+ E increases and henceP J I P T . When V A increases to a critical value such that J = E ,P J I P T = E T . If V A increases further beyond that,P J I P T stays constant.
Proof of Lemma 1: To prove the …rst part of the lemma, suppose the conclusion is false, i.e., thatP J V T + V A + S C + C , so that C = V T + C . After a successful cash o¤er, original shareholders of the acquiring …rm for whom V A + V T + S + A C < P J want to sell their shares. The value of their shares is P JFA (min f(P J V A V T S + C ) ; A g).
Substituting for P J and C , the value of their shares is at least
On the demand side, shareholders of the original target for whom V A +V T +S + T C > P J wish to buy shares in the joint …rm, and they have cash not exceeding C = V T + C V T + h T to invest. Thus, equating total demand with the value of the shares supplied yields V T + h T (V A + S)F A min l T ; A , contradicting the lemma's premise, thus establishing the …rst part of the lemma. The proof of the second part of the lemma is in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove the …rst statement, suppose instead that C P T = V T + < V T + C . Then the median target shareholder must hold the joint …rm, i.e., equation (13) (i) must hold. Note that (V T + V A + S C + C ) C increases in C for C 2 [0; P T ]
under V A > P T S. Therefore, from equation (13) (i),
where the …rst equality follows from P T = V T + T and the second follows from P J V T + V A + S + min ( T ; A ) C and T A . From this, we have
a contradiction.
To prove the second statement, examine equation (13) (i):
Rearranging, we have
Taking limits on both sides yields
However, because C (V T + C ), we also have lim V T + h = F T ( E )
To prove the …rst part of the proposition, note that if S
Thus, by Lemma 2, the acquirer's optimal o¤er is never approved.
Proof of Lemma 4: Refer to equation (21) and note that (V T + S C) strictly decreases in C while pro( C (C) T ) is continuous in C. The proof follows from a similar argument as that of Lemma 2. 
Proof of
where (17) and (23) Proof of Proposition 4: Follows directly from Result 3.
Proof of Lemma 6:
We have from equations (11) and (3) that
Note the right-hand-side of equation (37) is decreasing in E for E 2 l T ; h T , thus
which, combined with the condition A T , establishes the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let E be the median target shareholder value corresponding to the equity o¤er. If the success probability is strictly positive, Lemma 2 and equation (??)
in the proof of Lemma 3 yield:
Next, consider a case in which A = T , and consider the limiting case in which h T is arbitrarily close to . Then E approaches . Then the RHS of (38) equals
It then follows that there exists S such that the RHS of (38) < S < : In light of (38), an equity o¤er can be made that maximizes the payo¤ of the acquirer's management and has a strictly positive probability of success. Furthermore, in light of Proposition 3, the equity o¤er is preferred to a cash o¤er. In addition, from (9), we have R E < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Since the marginal holder of the joint …rm in a cash o¤er has a private valuation of at least A , the price of the joint …rm satis…es
Using (21) and Lemma 4, we have V T + S C > 0.
Combining these inequalities yields P J > P A . which contradicts the condition J;1 J;1 + 2V + S = 1 2 J;1 . Therefore, J monotonically increases in . In light of (32) and the fact that is independent of , D monotonically increases in . Next, note that (30) yields J = 2 if = 1. Because J monotonically increases in as we have shown above, J < 2 for all < 1, which, combined with (32), establishes the rest of the proof.
Proof of

